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INTRODUCTION

Ten forty-five at night on a busy Fort Worth street, a drunk driver
critically injured nineteen-year old college student Sam Jones.' The
police and paramedics were dispatched, but by the time they reached
Sam, he was near death due to massive head injuries. The paramedics
took Sam to the hospital where he was placed on life support.
Through hospital tests, doctors determined that Sam was "braindead"' 2 and nothing more could be done for him.
1. Fictional name and portrayal.
2. Brain-death occurs when the brain no longer responds to stimuli, controls reflexes, or causes respirations. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 259

(Clayton L. Thomas ed., 18th ed. 1997).
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Since Sam's body was otherwise uninjured and his organs were suitable for transplantation, the hospital contacted an organ procurement
agency per state and federal law. Nowhere in Sam's belongings did
the agency find a donor card, or anything else that would indicate that
Sam wanted his organs donated. For four hours, the agency and police searched to no avail for Sam's next of kin in order to gain consent
for organ donation. Little did they know that Sam's parents were outof-town. Upon request by the agency, the county medical examiner
permitted the removal of Sam's organs for transplantation in another
individual.
The above example illustrates what could occur under current Texas
law when a person does not carry a card of some sort indicating that
he or she does not want to donate organs in the event of death. There
is not a problem with this scenario if Sam wanted his organs donated
upon his death. However, if Sam or his parents were opposed to donating his organs, they would have no remedy under current Texas
law.
Section 521.405 of the Texas Transportation Code allows a medical
examiner to permit the removal of a decedent's "heart, lung, kidney,
liver, or other organ or tissue that requires a patient support system"
if the decedent's next of kin cannot be contacted within four hours
after death is pronounced.' Put simply, if a person dies and does not
want their organs donated due to personal reasons, and their next of
kin or personal representative cannot be located within four hours,
their organs can be harvested.
Texas is the one state that allows only four hours to find the next of
kin or a personal representative. The other states that allow a medical
examiner to harvest organs or other tissue without consent from the
next of kin or a personal representative are less restrictive and require
that a reasonable search for those individuals be conducted first (except for California which has a twelve hour time period to search after
death is pronounced).4 The Texas statute (1) interferes with a quasi3. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.405(b) (Vernon 1999).
4. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-844 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-604 (Michie 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (West
Supp.1999);

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 327-4 (Michie 1996);

IDAHO CODE

§ 39-3405

(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-2-16-4.5 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 142C.4A (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509 (Supp. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1999);
MorNr. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:5 (1999); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT.

§ 97.956 (1999); R.I.

§ 26-28-5 (Supp. 1997); Wis.

GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-4 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
STAT. ANN. § 157.06(4) (West Supp. 1999). Some state

statutes provide for only corneal removal. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-620 (1998)
(allowing the removal of corneas for transplantation and pituitary glands for "research, education, or therapy"); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (West 1992); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, § 14 (West 1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 8641 (West
Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-204 (1996).
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property right and thus is a violation of a person's substantive due
process rights; (2) violates American notions of free-will; (3) conflicts
with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act; and (4) is basically unreasonable in its application.
Part I of this comment illustrates the historical background of the
organ shortage. Part II discusses the response of the federal government, other states, and other countries to the organ shortage. Part III
discusses Texas's response to the organ shortage and Texas's version
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. It also discusses why Texas
should repeal section 521.405 of the Texas Transportation Code and
provides alternative methods of procuring organs for transplantation
other than the aforementioned statute.
This comment is not meant to sway anyone from organ donationquite the contrary.5 The purpose of this note is to illustrate the importance of having a choice about what we want to happen to our bodies
after we die. Nothing is quite so personal to us as our body, for it is
the vessel that carries our soul. For that very reason, it should be usnot the state-that determines its destiny.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ORGAN SHORTAGE

Over the last 30 years, survival rates of transplant recipients have
drastically increased since the improvement of surgical techniques, organ preservation techniques, and the development of new anti-rejection drugs.6 While technology has made successful transplants
possible, the lack of one essential element, the organs themselves,
presents a special problem.
On average, three thousand people will die each year while waiting
for an organ transplant.' Currently, there are over fifty-eight thousand people waiting for transplants, but in 1997, only fifty-five hundred organs were donated.8 While most Americans-eighty-five
percent-support organ donation, only about twenty-eight percent actually take steps to donate their organs. 9
5. For general organ donation information, a list of organ procurement agencies,

and an on-line organ donor card form, see The Living Bank: The Only National Organ

&

Tissue

Donor Registry

(visited

September

3,

2000)

<http://

www.livingbank.org>.
6. See Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States System
of Organ Donation, The InternationalSolution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act:
"And the Winner is... ",20 J. CORP. L. 5, 6 (1994).
7. See Stephanie Stapleton, Students Spread Word about Organ Donation, AM.
MED. NEWS, Dec. 21, 1998, at 19.
8. See id.
9. See Edward J. Saub et al., Do Patients want to Talk to Their Physicians about
Organ Donation? Attitudes and Knowledge about Organ Donation:A Study of Orange
County, California Residents, 23 J. COMMUNiTY HEALTH, Dec. 1, 1998 at 407, 408.
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Several factors contribute to the organ shortage. First, individuals,
in general, are reluctant to donate. 10 The reasons for not donating
include: "denial of mortality; fear that the medical community will not
use every effort to save the donor patient's life in order to harvest the
patient's organs; opposition to organ donation stemming from a religious belief or the belief that the surviving family should decide the
question; and disgust at the idea of having an organ removed."" Another factor is that some physicians are reluctant to approach family

members about donating their deceased loved one's organs.' 2 Physi-

cians may feel that approaching a grieving family member about organ donation is inappropriate at an already difficult time.' 3
Additionally, families of persons who die with or without a donor

card may not authorize the donation of the decedent's organs for various reasons.' 4 For instance, a family member may be too traumatized

by a loved one's sudden death to consent to donation.' 5 In other situations, the family member may not fully understand that their loved
one is brain-dead despite a beating heart.' 6 Still others believe that by

they are giving up on any hope of their loved
consenting to donation,
17
one recovering.

Public skepticism about the fairness of the organ distribution system
also leads to the scarcity of organs.' 8 In recent years, the media questioned whether celebrities such as Mickey Mantle, Larry Hagman,
Evel Knievel, or David Crosby received their new organs because
they were next on the transplant list or because of their celebrity sta10. See David E. Jefferies, Note, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to
Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 628-29 (1998).
11. Id. Most major religions accept organ donation despite the belief otherwise.
See Michelle Kaufman, Organ Donation Can Be the Gift of Life, INTELLIGENCER
JOURNAL, Apr. 3, 1999, at A5; Organ Transplants:A Web of Information, 29 NURSING, Oct. 1, 1999, at 14; Beatrice Robin, Louisiana Steps Up Push for Organ Donation, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 6, 2000, at 1F3; see also London
Health Centre, Religious and CulturalAttitudes About Donation (last modified Dec.
1, 1996) <http://www.lhsc.on.ca/transplant/religatt.htm>. Many religious leaders go
beyond just accepting organ donation and actively promote the practice to their congregations. See Geraldine A. Collier, Hadassah Begins National Drive to Encourage
Organ Donations, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1999, at Cl; Religious Leaders to
Ask Faithful to Consider Organ Donation, FLA. TODAY, Nov. 14, 1998, at 5A.
12. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 629-30.
13. See id. at 630.
14. See id. at 629 (citing Melissa N. Kurnit, Organ Donation in the United States:
Can We Learn from Success Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 427
(1994)); Teri Randall, Too Few Human Organsfor Transplantation,Too Many in Need
...and the Gap Widens, 265 JAMA 1223, 1223 (1991).
15. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 629.
16. See id.
17. See id. (citing Kurnit, supra note 14, at 429).
18. See William DeJong et al., Options for Increasing Organ Donation: The Potential Role of FinancialIncentives, StandardizedHospitalProcedures,and Public Education to Promote Family Discussion, 73 MILBANK QUARTERLY 463, 463 (1995).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol6/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V6.I2.4

4

Rutherford-McClure: To Donate or Not to Donate Your Organs: Texas Can Decide For You

2000] TO DONATE OR NOT TO DONATE YOUR ORGANS

245

tus. 19 Some people have the opinion that celebrities will receive organs in preference to the average Joe, so they choose not to take part
in the process.2 °
In addition to the above factors, there is another factor that prevents individuals from receiving transplants-money. Over sixtyseven million people lack insurance to cover the costs of heart, lung,
liver, or kidney transplants. 21 Estimates are that between twentynine and seventy-five percent of the uninsured are less likely to be
treated aggressively and receive a high-cost inpatient procedure. 2
One author states that "the rich can purchase health services at the
expense of the poor, since the poor can donate organs but will most
likely not be able to afford organ transplants. '2' 3 Moreover, unless a
19. See, e.g., Kathy A. Edgar, Celebrity Illnesses Bring Attention to Organ Donation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 1999, at 1B; Kevin Lamb, Organ Replacement;
Football Great Adding His Name to Transplant List, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 9,
1999, at 1C; Jay Mariotti, Payton's Dignity Shines Through Life's Dim Reality, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at 114; Mary Otto, Overhaul Urged in System Allocating
Transplant Organs Critics Say the Current ProceduresSometimes Fail to Serve Those
with the Greatest Need, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 21, 1999, at 3A; Clarence Page, Editorial, Payton Shined Light on Organ Shortage, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Nov. 8, 1999, at A10; Jackie Rothenberg, Some Fan Favorites Saved by the System,
N.Y. POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at 6; Sharon Schmickle, Wait Time for Organ Donations:Is it
Fair? Walter Payton's Need For a Liver TransplantHas Put a Spotlight on a Controversy in the Allocation System, STAR-TRIB. NEWSPAPER OF THE TWIN CITIES, Feb. 4,
1999, at Al; Mike Stobbe, Evel Knievel Given Liver Transplant,TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 28,
1999, at 1; Herb Whitney, Losing the Waiting Game: Youth Battles Insurerfor Lung,
Liver Transplants, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1999, at B1.
Although Mickey Mantle's transplant was met with some skepticism, in the end, the
publicity associated with the transplant had positive ramifications. Forney High
School student Clay Jones, influenced in part by Mantle's organ transplant, decided to
donate his organs upon death and indicated that intent on his driver's license. He told
his mother that he could not "understand why anyone would not want to be an organ
donor." Just weeks after expressing his wish to donate, during a high school football
practice, Clay was struck by lightning and died five days later at Baylor University
Medical Center in Dallas. Clay's generosity and selflessness helped save a man's life
when he received one of Clay's kidneys. See Linda Jones, One Easy Decision (visited
Nov. 14, 1999) <http://web2.airmail.net/autiger/Clay.htm> (originally printed in "Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings.").
Mantle's family continues to promote organ donation with The Mickey Mantle
Foundation. "Our initial mission is the complete elimination of the loss of life or the
loss of quality of life due to the lack of organs and tissue available for transplantation."
The Mickey Mantle Foundation (visited Nov. 14, 1999) <http://
www.transweb.org/mantle.html>.
20. See Jennifer Flasher, Transplants: Who Should Get Them First; How to Raise
Donation Rates-Public Has Many Misconceptions About Donations, Wis. ST. J.,
June 18, 1998, at 13A, available at WL 5874723.
21. See Diane M. Dewar, Allocating Organ Transplant Services: What Can be
Learned from the United States Experience?, 56 REV. OF Soc. ECON. 157, 163 (1998);
cf. Randall, supra note 14, at 1223 ("Many people who could benefit from a transplant
are never added to the list because they could not afford the transplant and the subsequent expensive immunosuppressive therapy .
.
22. See Dewar, supra note 21, at 158.
23. Id. at 163.
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person can prove the ability to pay for a transplant, many transplantation centers will not place them on an organ waiting list.24
Certain criteria have to be met before an organ can be transplanted,
which further hinders the donation process. Optimally, the donor
should be under fifty-five years of age, brain-dead, but still have a
beating heart.2 5 Not every organ is suitable for transplantation. Certain diseases, age, and physical damage to organs caused by blunt
trauma or oxygen insufficiency may make organs unsuitable for
transplantation.26
Texas has made organ donation even more difficult by discontinuing
the practice of allowing individuals to indicate on their driver's license
whether or not they want to donate.27 A person must now jump
through additional hoops in order to become a registered organ donor. Organ procurement agencies now provide donor cards to the
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) who distribute the cards to
"interested individuals" when those individuals obtain a license or renewal. 28 The individual must fill out the card and send it to the organ
bank. Making it harder for an individual to donate organs decreases
the chance that they will donate. There is no single reason for the
organ shortage. Likewise, there is no single answer.
II.
A.

RESPONSE TO THE ORGAN SHORTAGE

The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

In response to the organ shortage, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted and approved in 1968,
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). The UAGA's purpose
was to increase the supply of organs by allowing mentally competent
people eighteen years of age or older the right to choose whether they
wanted to donate their organs. 29 The UAGA was also enacted to protect those who procured organs and tissues from cadavers in good
faith from criminal or civil liability.30 This protection was meant to
encourage the medical profession to participate 3in1 the organ procurement process, thus increasing the organ supply.

Although physicians under this system did not have to obtain the
consent of the next of kin to have the deceased relative's organs
24. See id. at 163.

25. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 626.
26. See id.
27. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.401 (Vernon 1999).
28. See id.

29. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 2 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 99-100
(1993) (listing categories of persons allowed to donate the decedent's body); see also
Jefferies, supra note 10, at 627-28.
30. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 15.
31. See id. (citing Daniel G. Jardine, Comment, Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts:

The Truth and Consequences, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1655, 1656).
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32
donated, the physicians usually acquiesced to the family's wishes.
"However, family members may not donate the decedent's body [or
organs] if they have actual notice that the decedent did not want the
body [or organs] donated. 33 While the UAGA was praised for allowing individuals to choose to have their organs donated, it still did
not significantly increase organ donation.34
In 1987, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws amended the UAGA to remedy the problems of the previous UAGA. There were two main changes. The first revision was
that organs could not be sold for transplantation purposes. 35 Second,
doctors were now required to notify the hospital of potential organ
donors.3 6 Another change was that it eliminated the requirement that
two witnesses sign the organ. donation card.37 Additionally, the
amendment provided that the desire of the donor is given priority
over the desires of the family.38 Like the 1968 UAGA, the 1987
UAGA allows certain persons to donate the organs of the deceased
when the deceased did not express whether or not they wanted to
donate.3 9 If the decedent's family cannot be located, the 1987 UAGA
states that the coroner may permit the removal of a part from a body
under certain conditions. 40 The UAGA requires that a reasonable

32. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 628.
33. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 14.
34. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 628.
35. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 10 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 58 (1987).
Section 10 states: "A person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase
or sell a part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur
after the death of the decedent." Id.
36. See id. § 5(a) (discussing routine inquiry and required request under the 1987
UAGA).
37. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 16-17.
38. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (amended 1987), 8 U.L.A. 34 (1993)
(stating that "(a)n anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is
irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person after the
donor's death").
39. See id. § 3.
40. See id. § 4 (1987). Section 4(a) provides:
The [coroner] [medical examiner] may release and permit the removal of a
part from a body within that official's custody, for transplantation or therapy, if:
(1) the official has received a request for the part from a hospital, physician,
surgeon, or procurement organization;
(2) the official has made a reasonable effort, taking into account the useful
life of the part, to locate and examine the decedent's medical records and
inform persons listed in Section 3(a) of their option to make, or object to
making, an anatomical gift;
(3) the official does not know of a refusal or contrary indication by the decedent or objection by a person having priority to act as listed in Section 3(a);
(4) the removal will be by a physician, surgeon, or technician; but in the case
of the eyes, removal may be by an enucleator;
(5) the removal will not interfere with any autopsy or investigation; and
(6) the removal will be in accordance with accepted medical standards; and
(7) cosmetic restoration will be done, if appropriate.
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search be conducted for the next of kin. 41 Moreover, the Act indicates that the medical examiner must take into account the useful life
of the organ and locate the decedent's medical records before removing body parts.42
The 1987 UAGA requires that hospitals ask each patient if they are
an organ donor. 43 If a patient is an organ donor, a copy of the donation document is placed in the patient's medical records.41 If, however, the patient is not a donor and the attending physician consents,
the hospital staff must discuss with the patient the options of organ
donation.45 The hospital staff is required to discuss these options with
the patient's family members if the patient's chart does not indicate
whether the patient wants to donate organs and the patient is near
death.46

A Hastings Center report cited several problems with the current
system of organ procurement. 47 These problems include the following: (1) failure of persons to sign written directives; (2) failure of police and emergency personnel to locate written directives at accident
sites; (3) uncertainty on the part of the public about the circumstances
and timing of organ recovery; (4) failure on the part of medical personnel to recover organs on the basis of written directives; (5) failure
to systematically approach family members concerning donation; (6)
inefficiency on the part of some organ procurement agencies in obtaining referrals of donors; (7) high wastage rates on the part of some
organ procurement agencies in failing to place donated organs; (8)
failure to communicate the pronouncement of death to next of kin;
and (9) failure to obtain adequate informed consent from family
members.48 Like the 1968 UAGA, the 1987 version failed to remedy
the organ shortage. Perhaps the failure of the 1987 UAGA is due in
part to the states' ambivalence to adopt the amended statute. The
consent provisions and the routine inquiry requirement are troublesome to some states.4 9 Since hospitals in the states that have not
adopted the 1987 version of the UAGA are not required to inquire as
to patients' wishes, many people who would have donated (in their
own or representative capacity) do not get the opportunity to do so.

Id. (emphasis added).

41. See id. §§ 3(a), 4(a)(2).
42. See id. § 4(a)(2).
43. See id. § 5(a).
44. See id.

45. See id.
46. See id. §§ 3(a), 5(b).

47. See

UNIFORM ANATOMICAL

GIFr ACT (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 20-21 pref-

atory note (1993) (quoting Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 31-32).
48. See id.
49. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 18.
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The National Organ Transplant Act

Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in
1984 to develop a national organ-sharing and procurement system
through the National Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).5 0 The NOTA established federal grants for organ procurement agencies, prohibited the sale of organs, created a Task Force
on Organ Transplantation and developed a national scientific registry
of transplant recipients.51 As with the UAGA, the NOTA failed to
alleviate the organ shortage problem.52
C. Other States
All states have adopted the 1968 UAGA in some form.53 At least
21 states have adopted the 1987 version of the UAGA.54 In all states,
the medical examiner has jurisdiction of bodies under certain circumstances such as homicides. 55 About half the states allow the removal
of a part from a body without consent under additional circumstances. 56 The wording of these state statutes is similar to, if not verbatim of, the 1987 UAGA. The medical examiner must receive a request
for the body part from a hospital, physician, surgeon, or organ procurement agency, and there must have been a reasonable5 7 effort to
contact the next of kin before removing the body part. Moreover, the
medical examiner must take into account the useful life of the part
and make a reasonable effort to locate the decedent's medical records
to determine whether the decedent has executed a document of an
anatomical gift.58 Additional requirements are that the removal of tissues or organs must be done by a physician, the removal will not interfere with any autopsy or investigation, and cosmetic restoration will
50. See National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1994),
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (1988); see also Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6,
at 31-32.
51. See National Organ Transplant Act § 101.
52. See id.
53. See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Comment, PersonalizingPersonalty: Toward a
Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222 (1990).
54. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 2 (amended 1987) Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 1999). The following states have adopted the
1987 UAGA: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
55. See Richard C. Froede & Roy G. Spece, Jr., Forensic and Medicolegal Aspects
of Transplantation,in ANESTHESIA AND TRANSPLANTATION SURGERY 1, 17 (Burnell
R. Brown, Jr. ed., 1987).
56. The other states that allow a medical examiner to remove organs suitable for

transplantation, with the exception of California which requires a 12 hour search, do

not require a particular time limit to find the next of kin. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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be done, if appropriate. 59 Some states allow for the removal of only
corneas if the medical examiner makes a reasonable effort to obtain
the 0next of kin's or personal representative permission before doing
so.

6

D.

Other Countries and Presumed Consent

The "presumed consent" system is used in many European countries to procure organs. Under this system, the decedent's consent to
organ procurement is presumed unless otherwise indicated.61 In the
absence of a wish expressed by the donor during life, organs may be
removed in the following circumstances: (1) only with the consent of
the person lawfully in possession of the body and subject to express
objection of the deceased or objection of the relatives, if available
(UK); (2) after the relatives have been informed of the intention to
remove organs, but irrespective of their consent (except for that of the
nearest relative, Norway); (3) once it is has been ascertained that the
relatives do not object (Italy); (4) where the dead person has not expressed an objection, this is confirmed by the relatives and consent is
then presumed (Belgium); and (5) irrespective of the relatives' view
(Austria). 62
Countries such as Austria, Poland, and Switzerland have the strongest presumed consent laws.63 In Austria, for example, the doctor does
not have to inform family members that organs will be taken.64 The
deceased can avoid having their organs harvested if a written objecARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-844 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (West
Supp.1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-3405
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-2-16-4.5 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 142C.4A (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509 (Supp. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:5 (1999); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 97.956 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-4 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-4-23 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 157.06(4) (West Supp. 1999).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-620 (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1, /2
(West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1565 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (requiring

59. See

§ 20-17-617 (Michie 2000);

only that the removal not interfere with an autopsy or subsequent investigation);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, § 14 (West 1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8641,
8641 (West Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-204 (1998).
61. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 634-35.
62. See I. Kennedy et al., The Case for "Presumed Consent" in Organ Donation,

351 THE LANCET 1650, 1650 (1998). France has established a computerized register
that lists those citizens who do not want their organs donated. Those citizens who are
not on the register are presumed to have consented to organ donation. Through the
registry, hospitals can immediately determine whether a deceased individual consents

to donation. See Alexander Dorozynski, France Creates Opt Out Register for Organ
Donation, 317 BRITISH MED. J., 234, 234 (1998).
63. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 21.
64. See id. at 22.
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tion accompanies the body.6 5 Family members may also rebut the
presumption of consent by informing the physician that the deceased
unmistakably did not want to donate; however, "the physician may
'66
ignore such statements.
Other countries such as Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, and
Sweden have adopted weak presumed consent laws. 67 In these countries, the family members can object to organ donation in place of the
decedent.68 The advantage of this system is that it increases the availability of organs and eliminates the need for organ donation cards.69
Also eliminated is the infliction of grief-upon family members by asking for consent to donate.7 ° Countries such as Austria, Belgium, and
France all have higher organ procurement rates than the United
States.7'
Disadvantages of this system include the following: the limitation of
individual autonomy and freedom; the heavy impact on those who are
unaware of their rights because they are uneducated or poor; and, the
procurement of organs from individuals who chose not to have their
organs donated because the doctor did not make a reasonable search
for the donor's registered objection. 72 The biggest drawback of presumed consent laws is that even when the deceased have clearly indicated opposition to donation, consent is still presumed.73 Critics take
exception to the presumed consent laws because the concept of "silence equals consent" is a hard one to accept. 74 Recognizing the shortcomings of the presumed consent principle, many European countries
are turning away from presumed consent.7 5
III.

THE TEXAS RESPONSE

A.

Texas Anatomical Gift Act and Texas Transportation
Code § 521.405
Texas adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (TAGA) in
1969.76 This act closely follows the language of the UAGA, which sets
forth the manner in which an individual can donate his body.77 An
65. See id.

66. Id. at 22.
67. See id. at 22.
68. See id. at 21-22.
69. See Jefferies, supra note 10, at 640.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 639-40.
72. See id. at 640-42.
73. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 22.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 35.
76. See Eric C. Sutton, Giving the Gift of Life: A Survey of Texas Law Facilitating
Organ Donation, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 959, 969 (1991) (providing an overall discussion
of the Texas Anatomical Gift Act, codified as TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 692.001-.016 (Vernon 1992)).
77. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.003 (Vernon 1992).
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individual may do so by will or by another document.78 The statute
also delineates who may execute a gift in place of the decedent if there
is no actual notice that the decedent had contrary intentions.79
Perhaps the most important aspect of the TAGA are the hospital
protocols the act sets forth in the 1987 addition.8" Hospitals are now
required to "develop a protocol for identifying potential organ and
tissue donors from among those who die in the hospital."'" At or near
the time of death, a hospital representative must inquire whether the
patient is an organ donor.82 If the patient is not a donor, the hospital
representative must advise the patient's representative about the options of organ donation.83 In these discussions, communication with a
patient's family requires sensitivity to their beliefs and circumstances. 84 However, hospital personnel are required to make a notation in the decedent's medical records that the inquiry was made. 85
The TAGA also places a limitation on civil and criminal liability for
persons (medical examiners and hospital personnel) who act in good
faith in accordance with their duties.86 Good faith is not clearly defined in the statute, but it is described as "making a reasonable effort
to locate and contact the member or members of the highest priority
representative] who are
class [referring to the next of kin or personal
87
death.
of
time
the
near
or
at
available
In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Section 521.405(b) of the
Transportation Code, which states:
If a person listed in Section 692.004, Health and Safety Code, is not
contacted within four hours after death is pronounced, the medical
examiner may permit the removal of the heart, lung, kidney, liver,
support system to
or other organ or tissue that requires a patient
88
maintain the viability of the organ or tissue.
The following, in order of priority, must be notified within four
hours according to Section 692.004 of the Texas Anatomical Gift Act:
decedent's spouse, adult child, either parent, adult brother or sister,
decedent's guardian or any other person authorized to dispose of the
body.8 9 The situation in which this particular statute would take effect
78. See id. § 692.003(b).
79. See id. § 692.004. Individuals in the following order may donate "all or any
part of the decedent's body": the spouse of the decedent; an adult child of the decedent; a parent of the decedent; a brother or sister of the decedent; the decedent's
guardian; or a person authorized to dispose of the body. Id.
80. See Sutton, supra note 76, at 973-74.
81. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.013(a) (Vernon 1992).
82. See id. § 692.014(a).
83. See id. § 692.014(d).
84. See id. § 692.013(b)(2).
85. See id. § 692.013(b)(4).
86. See Sutton, supra note 76, at 973-74.
87. Id. at 976-77.
88. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.405(b) (Vernon 1999).
89. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.004 (Vernon 1992).
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is one where the decedent is brain-dead, but the body is maintained by
mechanical means (patient support system). Section 521.405(b) does
not come into play until "brain death" or "cardiac death" occurs as
required by section 521.404.90
This is a troublesome statute. The thought of the state taking a person's organs without consent is an uneasy one. It is counterintuitive.
If a person desires to donate their organs, they sign a card indicating
that desire. If a person does not want to donate, what is their recourse? They run the risk of having their organs harvested anyway.
Yet the state is willing to deprive a person of their decision without
setting up a system that allows those who do not wish to donate to so
indicate.
Even assuming the public interest in procuring organs for transplantation is paramount, the statute is poorly written and needs modification. The statute allows medical examiners to arbitrarily decide
whether a person's organs will be donated without setting any guidelines. Some medical examiners may decide that a four hour search
after the time of death is enough to satisfy the statute, others may not.
Is the medical examiner required to take into account the useful life of
the organ or tissue? Hopefully, the medical examiner is prudent and
would do so, but he is not required to do so by the statute.
B.

Statute Violates a Quasi-Property Interest

In early English common law cases, the decedent could not dispose
of his body by will because there was no property right in a dead
body.9 However, in 750 A.D., the Church determined that it had jurisdiction over the dead.92 In 1857, the court for Crown Cases convicted a son for removing his mother's corpse from her grave.9 3 The
court for Crown Cases rationalized their judgment by holding that
there were no property rights to a corpse.94 However, early American

courts granted the next of kin a quasi-property interest in the remains. 95 Most of these cases found a quasi-property right in a corpse
in determining who would take possession until burial.96
Presently, from a legal standpoint, the issue of whether there is a
property interest in dead bodies is unsettled.97 American courts have
90. Id. § 521.404 ("If the person meets the medical criteria for organ or tissue
donation, the receiving hospital or facility shall immediately notify a qualified organ

or tissue procurement organization as soon as brain death or cardiac death occurs.").
91. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Williams
v. Williams, 20 Ch.D. 659, 665 (1882)).
92. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 9.
93. See Regina v. Sharpe, 169 Eng. Rep. 959, 960 (1857).

94. See id.
95. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 10.
96. See id.
97. See Bray, supra note 53, at 220.
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not recognized absolute property rights in corpses.9" According to several courts, the state must assert a compelling interest before it can
take organs, recognizing that the next of kin's right to dispose of the
body is substantial.99
Quasi-property interests regarding human bodies can be analyzed
under the Constitution.1"' The United States Supreme Court has held
that although property interests are not defined by the Constitution,
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by the existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."' 1 Moreover, the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not
allow states to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.'0 2 Plaintiffs, in order to assert a valid due process
claim, must prove that under color of state law, they were deprived of
a property interest.10 3 Furthermore, it must be shown that the conduct was caused by "established state procedure rather than random
and unauthorized action."'0 4 Property has been described as "the totality of interests through which a person has a relationship to some
tangible or intangible object."' 1 5 Moreover, it is said that property is
not a static concept but one that evolves. 0 6 For instance, 0property
7
rights once included people as slaves and wives as chattels.1
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Brotherton v. Cleveland, °8
found that surviving relatives have an interest that rises to a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in a corpse under the due process
clause.' 09 In Brotherton, a widow claimed that her deceased husband's corneas were wrongfully removed." 0 Steven Brotherton was
killed in an automobile accident."' The hospital where he was taken
98. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 10.
99. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986) (explaining that corneal
tissue can be removed from a corpse without notice to the next of kin because the
state's interest in providing sight to the blind is great); cf.People v. Roehler, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 353, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that in order to intrude on a family's
expectation of privacy in their next of kin regarding the performance of an autopsy,
there must be a compelling state interest).
100. See Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the
Human Body-Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429,
436 (1992).
101. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
102. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
103. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
104. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984).
105. Scarmon, supra note 100, at 436.

106. See id. (citing

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 5 cmt. e (1936)).

107. See id. at 436-37.
108. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
109. Id. at 481-82.

110. See id. at 478-79.
111. See id. at 478.
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1 12
asked his widow if she would consider making an anatomical gift.
Because of her husband's aversion to making an anatomical gift, she
refused." 3 The hospital documented her refusal in her husband's
medical records." 4 Brotherton's body was taken to the coroner's office because his death was considered a possible suicide." 5 After the
autopsy, the coroner permitted an eye bank to remove Brotherton's
corneas without inquiring whether there was an objection to the removal of the eyes." 6 The widow filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"alleging that her husband's corneas were removed without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection clause.""' 7 The
court agreed with the widow and held that the harvesting of Brotherton's corneas constituted a deprivation of an entitlement,
or property
8
right, which required due process protection."
To analyze whether there is a constitutional basis for property rights
in bodies, Texas must recognize that right. Currently, there are no
Texas cases on point concerning due process claims in which a medical
examiner has procured a body or an organ. Texas also has not affirmatively stated whether it recognizes a quasi-property interest in a
corpse. 19
Although not affirmatively recognizing a quasi-property interest,
Texas case law implies such a right by protecting the next of kin's right
to preserve the body in the same condition "in which death leaves

112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 478.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 478-79. Several states have recognized a constitutionally protected property interest in dead bodies. See Whaley v. County of Tuscolosa, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117
(6th Cir. 1995) (asserting that Michigan recognizes the right of the survivors to possess the body of the deceased for burial and that it qualifies as a due process claim);
Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a due process property interest in dead bodies); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719.(8th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the next of kin's quasi-property right in a dead body, recognized by Arkansas,
qualifies as a due process property right); Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 970271-CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at *4 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998) (adopting the Brotherton court's analysis and holding that Missouri recognizes a constitutionally protected,
quasi-property right in controlling the disposal of dead bodies by next of kin); Wells v.
Nuwayhid, No. 96-C-4456, 1996 WL 674149, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996) (holding
that parents of a stillborn baby had the right of possession to their baby's remains).
But see Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 1986) (noting that survivors have
"no protectable or liberty property interest in the remains of their decedents... .");
Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (noting that
the rights to a decedant's body are not constitutionally protected); Crocker v. Pleasant, 727 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Powell but certifying a
question to the Florida Supreme Court to clarify if Powell precluded all section 1983
claims based on interference with a dead body).
118. See Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
119. Texas does have an older case, Foster v. Foster,220 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1920, no writ), which held that a widow does not have an absolute property
right in the body of her deceased husband. See id. at 218.
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it."' 2 ° The court in Terrill v. Harbin held that "[any interference with
such a right of possession of the body of a deceased by mutilation or
otherwise disturbing the body without the consent of the next of kin is
an actionable wrong for which a claim for damages may be maintained." 1 2' Furthermore, an individual may decide how his body is to
22
be disposed of after death.'
Additionally, in the context of section 521.405(b) of the Transportation Code, if a medical examiner takes organs from a deceased individual, the next of kin can claim deprivation of an interest in the
organs of that individual. 23 The interest is not so much in the organs
themselves, but in the right to bury the deceased without the state
mutilating the body or in a way other than which death left it.
According to the United States Supreme Court, it must be shown
that the conduct depriving an individual of due process regarding a
property interest was caused by an "established state procedure rather
than random and unauthorized action.' 1 24 In Texas, section 521.405
of the Transportation Code establishes a state procedure that authorizes medical examiners to procure organs without consent. 2 5 This
state procedure, combined with the above factors, creates a constitu26
tionally protected interest.
C. Statute Violates American Notions of Free Will
Free will as a theory "embraces the idea that individuals are selfdetermining agents, capable of being held morally responsible for
their chosen actions.' 1 27 Furthermore, free will "does not focus so
much on whether an act was freely chosen, but whether the individual
had the freedom to make the choice."'1 28 It can be argued that, since
free will is valued highly in our society, it rises above the need for
120. Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ
dism'd).
121. Id. at 947 (citing Love v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1936, writ dism'd)).
122. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

123. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.405(b) (Vernon 1999).
124. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984).

125. See

TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 521.405(b) (Vernon 1999).

126. See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
127. Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the
Deconstruction of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1997).
128. Id. True free will is limited by an individual's "internal nature and original
purpose." Richard Lowell Nygaard, Freewill, Determinism, Penology, and the Human
Genome: Where's a New Leibniz When We Really Need Him?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 417, 424 (1996). "I believe we have a free will, but that it is limited to a
degree that depends upon each person's genetic, physical, mental, and emotional

makeup, the sum of one's life experiences, and the environment and circumstances in
which the will is being exercised." Id. Basically, our conscience, our past, and our
values determine the choices we make. Such is the very basis of our democratic
society.
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"general advancement of scientific knowledge.' ' 129 Widely recognized
is the notion that Americans have freedom to make certain decisions
about their lives. Freedom to contract, marry, and to have children,
are among the choices we, as Americans, are able to make. 3 ° The

same should be said about organ donation.
Of course, one can argue that there are restrictions upon those freedoms 131 and that we are restricted likewise from choosing whether to
donate our organs when our personal representatives cannot be located. This is a flawed argument, however, because it presupposes
that individuals assume the risk that medical examiners may allow
procurement for transplantation of the individual's organs. For instance, a pregnant woman does not assume the risk that her baby will
be aborted without consent. Moreover, men and women do not assume the risk that they will be forced to marry someone they do not
want to without consent.1 32 Similarly, individuals have a right to do-

nate their organs, but they should not be forced to exercise that right
in the absence of consent. If an individual has not exercised that right,
129. Scarmon, supra note 100, at 442. As a country, the United States has historically moved from oppression towards free will. For example, "women and slaves
were denied full legal responsibility because they were thought to lack the capacity to
freely exercise their will." Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F. Rychlak, Mental Health
Experts on Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REv.
193, 197 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Today, most adults "are legally presumed to
have the ability to recognize the consequences of their actions and behave accordingly." Id.
130. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.7 (2d ed. 1990)
("From a utilitarian point of view, freedom to contract maximizes the welfare of the
parties and therefore the good of society as a whole. From a libertarian point of view,
it accords to individuals a sphere of influence in which they can act freely."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("if the right to privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion to matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or
beget a child."); see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-10 (2d. ed. 1988).
131. For instance, contracts must be fair and just. See TEX. Bus. COM. & CODE
ANN. § 2.302 (Vernon 1994) (allowing courts to refuse to enforce contracts with unconscionable provisions, enforce the contract only after severing the unconscionable
provision, or limit the application of the unconscionable clause). Moreover, individuals are restricted from marrying certain people, such as those who are underage, see.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.101-103 (Vernon 1998) (allowing underage marriages
only with parental permission or by court order), or who are relatives. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.004-2.009 (Vernon 1998) (prohibiting the county clerk from issuing
licenses to those who are, inter alia, related to one another). Additionally, the right to
terminate a pregnancy is limited. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002-.003 (Vernon
Supp. 2000) (allowing underage abortions only with parental notice or judicial
approval).
132. While some cultures arrange marriages, in the United States, a marriage cannot be forced upon a person. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.107 (Vernon 1998)
(providing for the annulment of a marriage obtained through "fraud, duress, or
force ...").
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and has not registered with an organ procurement agency, their organs should not be procured.
The courts have little problem upholding the notion that live donors
cannot be compelled to donate their tissues or organs. The case of
McFall v. Shrimp 3 3 is illustrative. Here, a patient needed a bone mar34
row transplant and the only compatible donor was a close relative.1
When the cousin refused to donate his marrow, the patient sought an
injunction compelling his cousin to donate. In refusing the patient's
request, the court held:
[Tihe common law has consistently held to a rule which provides
that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or
rescue or to take action to save another ....[T]he rule is founded
upon the very essence of our free society ....
For our law to compel
the Defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change
the very concept and principle upon which our society is founded.
To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual and would impose a rule which would know no
1 35limits, and one could not imagine
where the line would be drawn.
Evidently, in enacting Section 521.405,136 Texas has drawn the line
at the time of the person's death. However, this notion of taking organs without consent after death-i.e., presumed consent-goes
against other statutes in Texas, which give the decedent or his next of
kin the right to dispose of his body. For example, the Texas Health
and Safety Code allows an individual to dispose of his body in a will, a
prepaid funeral contract, or by a signed written instrument. 137 If the
decedent did not leave any written instructions concerning the disposition of his body, his next of kin has the "right to control the disposition.' 1 38 This would seem to indicate that an individual or his next of
kin have the right to choose how to dispose of the body. For a medical examiner to take organs without consent of the decedent or the
next of kin, goes against this proposition.
D. Section 521.405(b) Conflicts with the UAGA
The fact that a person may choose whether to donate their organs
implies that the system is voluntary. Texas adopted the language of
the UAGA very closely. The UAGA clearly is based on encouraged
voluntarism and not presumed consent.' 3 9 After an individual's
133. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County Ct. 1978).
134. See id. at 90.
135. Id. at 91.
136. TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.405(b) (Vernon 1997).
137. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
138. Id.
139. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 6, at 20 (noting the United States system is
based on "encouraged voluntarism").
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death, the UAGA gives the individual a legal right to decide the disposition of their bodies.' 40 An individual's intent is paramount.' 4 '
Texas, in essence, adopted a voluntary system and then contradicted
itself by adopting Section 521.405, which is basically a presumed consent type of statute. In the absence of any indication that a person
may not wish to donate, the medical examiner constructively
presumes that the decedent consented to donation. However, Texas's
presumed consent statute is not generally known by the public. More
than likely, the average citizen believes that the only way their organs
can be donated is by consenting to organ donation by obtaining an
organ donor card. Little would they suspect that in situations where
their next of kin cannot be located within a certain time period, Texas
can decide for them whether their organs will be donated for transplantation purposes. Basically, this statute negates the voluntary system that Texas has purportedly adopted because it takes the decisionmaking power out of citizens' hands in certain situations. There is no
system in Texas to allow those who do not want to donate their organs
to express that intention. If Texas wants presumed consent laws, it
needs to provide a registry for those who do not wish to donate their
organs and make that system known to the public.
This particular statute also differs from the UAGA in that it contains no language requiring the medical examiner to make "a reasonable effort, taking into account the useful life of the [body] part, to
locate and examine the decedent's medical records and inform [the
next of kin or personal representative] of their option to make, or
object to making, an anatomical gift.' 42 In fact, the statute omits any
language concerning reasonableness. The statute merely provides for
a four-hour search that does not require that the medical examiner
take into account the useful life of the body part. The UAGA version
seems to take a totality of the circumstances approach in determining
whether a medical examiner can take an organ, whereas Texas allows
procurement if certain circumstances are present.' 4 3 Basically, in
Texas the only inquiry into whether a medical examiner should take
organs is if four hours has elapsed after death is pronounced and if the
decedent is on a patient support system.

140. See id. at 32.
141. See id.

142.

UNIF. ANATOMICAL

GIFr ACT § 4(a)(2) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 43

(1993).
143. Those circumstances are that the decedent is on a patient support system and
that four hours have elapsed since the person has been declared dead. See TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 521.405(b) (Vernon 1998).
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E. Section 521.405(b) is Unreasonable in its Application

1. Four Hours is Not Enough Time to Search for Family Members
Texas is the only state that has such a restrictive time-frame of four
hours to search for the next of kin. Other states with similar statutes

require that medical examiners conduct a reasonable search.' 4 4 California is the only other state that has a specified time limit.'4 5 How-

ever, California's time limit of twelve hours is more reasonable than
the Texas time limit. Four hours is not always enough time to find the
next of kin as in situations where the deceased is unidentified or next
of kin cannot be located because they are out of town or away from a

telephone.
In July of 1999, the impracticality of this statute was proven in Fort
Worth. An unidentified man was found unconscious in a far southeast
Fort Worth field in the early hours of July 22.146 Doctors declared him
brain dead at 5:30 p.m. that same day. 1 47 At that point, section
521.405(b) took effect. The organ bank officials tried to identify the
man and his family, but their efforts proved futile. 148 The medical examiner was hesitant to release the decedent's organs 1 49 and commented that four hours is not enough time to identify a John Doe. 150
Lawyers from the organ bank went to court at 1:00 p.m. on July 23
seeking an order to compel the Tarrant County Medical Examiner to
release the organs for donation. 5 ' After state District Judge McGrath was satisfied that a reasonable search for the next of kin was
conducted, he granted the order at 10:25 p.m. that night. 152 Early the

144. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-844 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-617 (Michie 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (West 1998);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-3405 (1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-2-16-4.5 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142C.4A (West
1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1565 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 4-5o9 (Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West Supp.
1999); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (1999);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:5 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (Michie 1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.956 (1999); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-18.6-4 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-4-23 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 157.06(4) (West Supp. 1999).
145. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (West Supp. 2000); see also Jacobsen v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 963 F. Supp. 866, 872 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that a 48hour search for a man's parents who lived in Denmark was reasonable where the
statute only required a 12-hour search).
146. See Charlotte Huff, When Every Second Counts, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 31, 1999, at 1A.

147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Deanna Boyd, Five Patients Receive Organs From John Doe Donation Ordered by Local Judge, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 25, 1999, at lB.
150. See Huff, supra note 146, at 1A.
151. See id.
152. See Charlotte Huff & Deanna Boyd, Organs of Brain-dead Patient GrantedA Court Order is Given Under a Little-Used State Law Regarding Unidentified Bodies,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 24, 1999, at lB.
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next morning, five of the man's organs were harvested and sent to
area hospitals for transplantation.15 3
Over fifteen hours elapsed from the time the hospital pronounced
brain-death to when the judge ordered the organs' release. Several
additional hours passed before the organs were harvested. It was not
until six days later that the man was identified through a second set of
fingerprints as Arthur Forge Jr. of Fort Worth.' 54
As this case illustrates, ordinarily four hours is not enough time to
identify a John Doe and find his next of kin. 155 Fortunately, the trial
judge employed a totality of the circumstances approach in deciding
to allow removal of Forge's organs. Unfortunate would be the situation where a medical examiner allowed the removal of organs only
after four hours and the family subsequently disapproved of the
action.
2.

A Neutral Magistrate Should Determine Whether a Reasonable
Search was Conducted

In the previous example, the medical examiner chose not to exercise his authority and release Forge's organs. 5 6 Because the medical
examiner made that decision, the only recourse the organ bank had
was to file a motion to have the organs released.' 5 7 An objective
party, Judge McGrath, determined after nine-and-one-halfhours of
deliberation, whether the search for the man's family was
reasonable. 5 8
Unsettling is the fact that a medical examiner has the power to release organs for donation in only four hours from the time of death.
Should a medical examiner have that kind of power? Evidently, the
Legislature believes so. What if the medical examiner yields to pressure put upon him or her by the organ procurement agency to release
the organs after four hours from time of death? Under the statute the
medical examiner would have no liability because he is given the
power to release those organs. However, the question is did the medi153. See Boyd, supra note 149, at lB.
154. See Charlotte Huff, FingerprintTests Identify Organ Donor-BedfordPolice Department Technician Makes Match, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 29, 1999, at
lB. Forge's nephew reported him missing on July 26, three days after Forge's organs
were harvested. Despite the fact that there was a missing person's report on Forge, he
was not identified because of this report. Forge was identified after a second set of

fingerprints was taken. See id.
155. In this case, 32 hours of searching did not identify the John Doe or locate his
family. See Huff, supra note 146, at 1A. The County Medical Examiner felt that
more than four hours is necessary to locate the family. Id. ("'From my experience,
you do require a period longer than four hours to identify someone,' [Tarrant County
Medical Examiner Nizam Peerwani] said.").
156. See Boyd, supra note 149, at lB.
157. See id.

158. See id. Judge McGrath was quoted as saying: "You make an equitable balance-the benefits vs. the potential objections." Id.
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cal examiner take into account the useful life of the organ and
whether a reasonable search for the next of kin was conducted, or was
the decision made due to pressure from the organ procurement
agency? This question would be solved if a neutral magistrate made
the final decision to release the organs, taking into account the reasonableness of the search, the useful life of the organs, and the medical examiner's opinion regarding the circumstances.
F. Alternatives
1. Texas Should Allow Individuals to Disclose Preference on
Driver's Licenses
As mentioned in Part I, Texas no longer allows individuals to disclose on their driver's licenses whether they wish to donate their organs. 159 The procedure in place presently is that the Department of
Public Safety (DPS) workers give interested individuals a donor card
application provided by organ procurement agencies. In order for individuals to donate their organs, they must fill out a donor card and
send it to the organ procurement agency.
There are definite problems with this system. First, it assumes that
an average person on the street will know that he or she will have to
obtain a donor card from the DPS in order to donate. A person may
believe that since they had consented to donation on their driver's
license in the past that they will continue to do so. Second, there is a
chance that the DPS employee may not inform all individuals of the
donation process. The Transportation Code does not specifically indicate how the donor cards will be distributed, only that the department
will "provide a means to distribute donor cards." 160 If the DPS employee does not give an individual a donor application card, it may be
six years before that person will be exposed again to organ donation
information, thereby decreasing the chance that person will donate.' 6
Additionally, people live busy lives and even assuming that they have
the proper information in hand, it is no guarantee that they will fill out
the application and send it in. Moreover, the application may get lost
or be forgotten. Having the opportunity to say yes or no to organ
donation eliminates the foregoing problem.
2. National Registry Compiled by Way of Income Tax Returns
Another solution is to create a national registry of organ donors.
To do this, each person filing an income tax form will indicate on the
159. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.401 (Vernon 1999).
160. See id.
161. Texas driver's licenses are now renewed every six years as opposed to the previous practice of renewing every four years. See id. § 521.271(b). However, the Department of Public Safety may stagger license expirations so that a proportional
number of licenses expire every year. See id. § 521.101 historical note [Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 1372, § 8].
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form their willingness or unwillingness to donate. Organ procurement
agencies as well as police, medical examiners, and hospitals will have
instant computer access to the organ registry. Although the system
would not be perfect (due to computer malfunctions) more people
will participate simply because most people have to file tax returns.
Consequently, there would be little need to procure organs without
consent. This system used in conjunction with the above system of
indicating preferences on driver's licenses, would reach many more
people than any system in place now does.
3. Increased Public Education
Educating the public about organ donation would help increase the
supply. Physicians should, on a regular basis, talk to their patients
about donating their organs upon death. Let's face it, death is not the
most enjoyable thing to talk about. However, death is inevitable.
Who best can educate a person concerning their options to donate
other than a doctor? Moreover, it is best to discuss these issues before
a person becomes seriously ill. Studies have shown that doctors are
reluctant to approach a bereaving family.' 62 Patients approached
while healthy may be more willing to donate their organs. Doctors
can have their patients who are interested in donating fill out a donor
card in the office and then forward that information to an organ procurement agency.
Public education should also be focused on promoting family discussion about donation. 163 The focus should not primarily rest on getting people to sign organ donation cards alone, but should also
emphasize the importance of getting family members to discuss organ
donation.' 64 A 1992 Gallup survey indicated that ninety-three percent
of pollers would be "somewhat" or "very likely" to donate a deceased
family member's organs
if the deceased had expressed to them that
1 65
desire prior to death.
Many times, families do not discuss organ donation because it does
not occur to them to do SO. 1 6 6 Perhaps the organ donor card itself
could provide a stimulus for family discussion of the organ donation
o
issue. 1671h
The donor
card, if redesigned to include instructions to discuss one's desire to donate with family members and to require that
one family member sign the card, may promote family discussions. 168
162. See Robert M. Tenery Jr., Nation Must Face Organ Donation in a Meaningful
Way, 40 AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 20.
163. See DeJong, supra note 18, at 463.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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CONCLUSION

Texas should repeal Section 521.405 of the Transportation Code. At
the very least, the Legislature should provide a longer time period to
search for the decedent's next of kin or personal representative after
death is pronounced. Additionally, the statute should mandate the
medical examiner to take into account the totality of the circumstances in determining169whether the medical examiner permits procurement of an organ.
Texas should not take away our right to determine the manner in
which our bodies are to be handled after death. Our body is the thing
most personal to us as humans. The decision to donate one's organs is
a very personal one and should not be determined by the state. It is
wrong for the state to take our organs and presume that is the decision
we would have made for ourselves had we had the opportunity.
Perhaps those who do not desire to donate should tattoo "please do
not take my organs" across their chest. In a less extreme fashion,
those who do not want to donate should at least carry a card in their
wallets or purses indicating that sentiment. In the event that their relatives cannot be located within four hours of death, it may be the only
way their wishes will be respected.
Jennifer Rutherford-McClure
169. In determining whether the totality of the circumstances approach is used,
only the language on the face of the statute is analyzed. Perhaps in practice, a medical examiner would ordinarily have the prudence to take into account all the circum-

stances involved before permitting procurement of an organ.
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